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 Introduction
The Republic of Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa and bordered by Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Water constitutes the remaining border with the Gulf of Aden in the north and the Indian Ocean comprising the eastern seaboard. Somalis share a common ethnic identity, language and religion. The foundation of the political system was family and family ties. 2 Family relations underpinned larger units such as sub-clans that belonged to clans. 3 Commonly considered a patron-client network, before and during the civil war, Somalis fell into two categories: individuals were either a part of the patrimonial network or outside of it. If part of the network, individuals accepted the rule of the leader and exerted power over clients. These clients exerted power over other clients. As an outsider to the patron-client network, Somalis typically had little or no claim to power or authority where deposing those in the network was the only alternative. When no clan lineage was identified, Somalis were significantly more vulnerable and thus subjected to persecution. In Somalia, patron-client networks were largely based on clan alignment and the favors granted by an empowered Somali leader. There were six main clans in Somalia: Hawiye, Isaq, Dir, Darod, Rahanweyn and Digil. 4 Thus, conflict was largely based on the patron-client network with some clans possessing a marked advantage over others and the oppressive conditions the structure produced.
This paper argues that following, the fall of Mohammed Siad Barre's regime, leaders of different opposition groups mobilized the government, military, and clan structures towards their own political ends, leading to renewed conflict. Two primary protagonists dominated the Somali He vowed to eliminate rampant corruption, restore security and stability and push an agenda of reconstruction based on self-reliance. 9 Comparing himself to the Shermarke regime, Barre commented "Injustice and maladministration, lack of social progress and economic development, coupled with a sinking national morale, compelled us to bring about a change." 10 One of his first acts as dictator was to ban tribalism by making it a criminal act to both publicly and privately acknowledge existence of clans or payment of diya. Diya is the financial compensation paid to the victim or heirs of a victim in the cases of murder, bodily harm or property damage.
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Violators were subject to arrest. Ironically, faction leaders could echo these earlier critiques when discussing Barre's regime when he was ousted from power.
The Regime and personal loyalty was valued more than skill and merit is just one example.
Perhaps more telling was Barre's belief that his regime was indivisible, accountable to no one and superior to any other political ideology. Nonetheless, Barre did hold on to power for more than 20 years until 1991. Opposition groups that set aside their differences and composed a united front that ultimately overthrew him. But why did the united opposition groups that ousted Mohammed Siad Barre's regime then devolve into fighting after the fall of Barre's regime? A closer examination of Aideed, Mahdi, Jess and Morgan follows to explain.
 General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed and United Somali Congress
Mohammed Farah Aideed was a military leader in the Somali army. He was a member of the Habar Gidir sub clan of the Hawiye based largely in the central Somalia. 13 Aideed was a learned military officer who was trained by both the Italians and Soviets. Barre was from the "We have to realize that the model of healthy and functional democracy that we are planning to adopt in Somalia is such that every one will have perfect autonomy and satisfaction of serving the nation whole-heartedly, and no one will be able to exploit the people by becoming President, Prime Minster or a big boss." 17 The USC was created in 1989 as a primarily Hawiye organization. Hawiye was a deliberate choice by the founding elders who recognized they made up the foundation of the Mogadishu business community and were the largest clan. More importantly, they were also subjected to Barre's oppressive regime and did not believe a lasting truce with him was possible.
Barre systematically manipulated clan-based violence targeting civilians to keep the opposition against him divided. His actions had the strategic effect of galvanizing clan-based identities, making equality and differences more distinct and exploitable. Further, clans not subject to Barre manipulation were left with a false sense of security that they were exempted or immune from
Barre's government harassment. 18 Barre's coercing of civilians highlighted the political and social costs of opposing his rule. The intended outcome of his coercion was to making the cost of supporting the opposition greater than the reward. Aideed was serving as Ambassador to India, Sri Lanka and Singapore when he was asked to lead the USC armed opposition. Aideed based his effort in Ethiopia, formed his own branch of the USC and began recruiting former soldiers who had defect from the Somali National Army in addition to mujahidin (jihad fighters). 19 He also formed a close and formal relationship with Somali National Movement (SNM).
The USC was initially organized on two fronts, one based in Mogadishu and the other in 
 Ali Mahdi Mohammed and United Somali Congress
Mahdi was a prominent businessman in Mogadishu. He was from the Abgal sub-clan of the Hawiye. Aideed's election as USC Chairman was also an attempt to subjugate his authority.
External influences from Italy encouraged another USC leader, Ali Mahdi to declare himself interim president of Somalia. Mahdi vowed to "give first priority to the interests of the Somali people and their unity before anything else, with respect for the sacred religion and the age-old heritage of the Somali nation." 21 Opposition groups, including the SNM, opposed Mahdi's claim of interim president. Their opposition was largely personality driven. Each group understood that the group in power had the most to gain in terms of power and influence. But the USC was hopeful that Aideed would accept Mahdi with the caveat that Mahdi would consult Aideed on all major policy and appointment decisions. 22 . Aideed's USC faction target of the opposition and the civilians that composed them did not enjoy the sanctity of security typically afforded to noncombatants. This was true of all opposition groups. 26 Between the two USC factions lead by Aideed and Mahdi, reportedly 14,000 people died and 27,000 were wounded from November 1991 to February 1992 alone. 27 The northern region's SNM saw Mahdi's interim presidency as another example of southern arrogance. Largely composed of the Isaq clan-family, SNM forces had previously waged war against the Barre regime and capturing the countryside. The SNM supported Aideed's USC forces. However, following Mahdi's declared position, the SNM consider USC a better alternative to Barre. 
Unfortunately, that was not an acceptable compromise for

 Conclusion
The period of the Somali Civil War from 1991-1995 is externally described as "a ward of the international aid community." But more critical to Somalis, internally, Somalia is best described as a nation that devolved into a state of repression and expropriation. Faction leaders exploited clan grievances that existed before Barre's regime and used the people as political tools to strengthen their own hold on power and territory were undermining the same for their rivals.
Leaders used khat and food supplies to increase their own coffers favoring those clans or groups that displayed allegiance to their cause. Stated differently, "civil servants clever, powerful or well-connected enough to place themselves at strategic spigots in the foreign aid pipeline." Morgan's SNF was largely made up of members of the Harti clan. 43 The case of Somalia reflects African leaders' attitudes toward territorial integrity. From 1991 to at least 2012, Somalia has had no effective central government. 44 
